By Julian Marias
(This is a transcript of a lecture by Julian Marias, which, as we know, not using a text written-in editing the style is oral. Course Conference "Styles of Philosophy", Madrid, 1999/2000 - Edition: Jean Lauandos.
Husserl, as you know, is perhaps the first great philosopher of the twentieth century. Interestingly, there are three great philosophers who are almost contemporaries: Brentano, Dilthey and Husserl. Brentano was born in 1838 in 1833 Dilthey and Husserl in 1859. Three figures of high importance and that means the first level of the thinkers of our century.
is interesting to note how Husserl is somewhat parallel to Brentano and also there is some controversy with Dilthey. There is some opposition and yet three are as attached.
Brentano Husserl's disciple, has some intellectual background that point in the direction of Aristotle, Leibniz, Bolzano also, whom he has a scientific background, in which it differs from Dilthey, who has been trained psychological, philosophical, which stems from the history of psychology. Husserl
And part of mathematics. Husserl writes very young one Philosophy of Arithmetic. But soon became interested in philosophy and published a book Logical Investigations - Untersuchungen Logische , a book published the year 1900-is interesting to note from the outset: Husserl's name is linked to the idea of \u200b\u200bphenomenology, but in this book, the word "phenomenology." (The English edition was published very soon, in 1929, when it had been translated into any other Western language "in four volumes, translated by Manuel García Morente and José Gaos). This book has brought not the concept of phenomenology, but the reality of phenomenology. The term will appear later, there is a very brief written strenge Philosophie als Wissenschaft , philosophy as rigorous science, and represents some controversy regarding Dilthey.
There is even a phrase somewhat critical because Dilthey says, referring to "facts" part of historical facts, psychological facts, but you can not abstract from facts, it is "ex pumice aquam" theory out of facts is like trying to draw water from the pumice. But later, when you see the whole of the two philosophies-that of Dilthey and Husserl, "is found a deep kinship.
The starting point of Husserl's philosophical critique of psychologism. (By the way, the thesis of Joseph was on the critical Gaos psychologism in Husserl. Do not forget that he released to Husserl in Spain was Ortega and depart from Husserl the two theses of the two disciples of Ortega-test a Zubiri deljuicio phenomenological theory and critique of psychologism Gaos).
The first work in which it appears the idea of \u200b\u200bphenomenology itself is ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, which is 1913. This book is the theory of phenomenology, the practice, the stakes of this method, just as method is the Logical Investigations.
The starting point is the critique of psychologism, which dominated the thinking of the last decades of the nineteenth century. The idea is the following: logic, ethics, aesthetics ... deal of thought, the science of thought is psychology and therefore these disciplines are psychological. Psychologism is called the dominant philosophical attitude in the last decades of the nineteenth century, that psychology is the root, the foundation of philosophy, especially the three major disciplines: logic, ethics and aesthetics.
But Husserl is absolutely opposed to this and makes a basic and very important distinction. And he says that there is a misunderstanding: it is clear that it is thought, but the word "thought" means two things: mental activity, which has nothing to do with it, and the objects, the behavior of objects: logic does not say anything to acts of thought - I can think of one thing or another, that thought can be justified or not, the logic no mention of thoughts, mental activity does not speak, speaks to the objects of the contents of thought. The same is true of ethics or aesthetics ...
Therefore, these disciplines do not address philosophical thought, mental activity, but the behavior of objects, which he called ideal. Psychic acts are real acts are mental acts of thinking, therefore, something I think that they are in time, which occur, which have a certain individuality. What Husserl called ideal objects has nothing to do with it: when for example, affirms the validity of the principle of contradiction does not mean that I can not think that A is B and not-B at the same time, but the object A can not be B and not-B at the same time. Therefore does not refer to a mental ability to think and I can not think of anything, but objects can not only act under the principle of contradiction. The same we say of ethical and aesthetic principles.
Then, of course, is a translation of psychology to the validity of ideal objects, which are individual, not temporary, which are not affected by the individuality or the circumstances of reality and are just something that is valid. And these ideal objects have universal validity, are not in any way affected by the vicissitudes of the real and simply have the character of objective and universal validity. Then
Husserl tries to describe precisely those objects that are the subject of intuitive knowledge, knowledge with evidence, with a universal validity and, again, are not affected. Real things are affected by time, have an individual character, with reality, which are not ideal objects.
What are the ideal objects? The numbers, shapes, species ... For example, the number seven. The number seven is not affected, does not age ... is simply a constant value and never changes or is affected by any particular circumstance.
species: the tree, the dog ... the species, not individuals, the colors: red, red and no red things, red things are real objects. Species and genera that are ideal objects. And therefore have a universal character and validity have no reality. This is fundamental: the unreality of ideal objects. Then
Husserl comes to finding a method, a basic method which is a descriptive method, descriptive of the ideal objects: the species, numbers, figures, logical principles, that whole area of \u200b\u200bideal objects - I used the word "sphere" is an ideal world and, again because it is fundamental, not real.
course, the consequence that Husserl draws is that it is a descriptive method, and is a descriptive method that retains a remnant of positivism. Husserl considers the positivism of Comte and the positivists is poor, incomplete, partial positivism he tries to make a total positivism, inclusive, that does not leave out any aspect of ideal objects. Naturally, this makes the method has to follow is a descriptive method, which preserves a remnant of positivism, Dilthey also remember you kept a remnant of positivism.
Husserl Positivism lies precisely in refusing to make any judgments of existence: neither confirms nor denies the reality of things or existence. There is also skepticism is no doubt, no doubt because if he doubted the measure would change the gender. If I deny the reality of objects or affirm or put in doubt, change the quality of the act, ie: you have to retain the quality of the act itself, but practicing what he called, with a Greek term, the epokhé , abstention, which called in German terms, the Einklammerung, the bracketing-or brackets.
That is, an act, with its content with its status of an act, simply put between parentheses, epokhé practice, refraining from any existential position, neither affirmed nor denied or doubted, because if I affirm or deny or hesitate, change the quality of the act. There is a principle which states that the phenomenology of perception is equivalent to a trial; perceive is to perceive something as existing, at this moment I'm watching you and I to see, to perceive them, perceive them as existing. But I do not take a phenomenological position: neither confirm nor deny that you exist, nor I doubt, because if they doubted execute a mental act differs from the usual, which is perceived: perception is accompanied by the belief in the perceived. But if I start to doubt, and this such position would be skeptical, then change the quality of the act. So what I do is just put in brackets, I abstain ( epokhé ) to take any position.
This will be the method of Husserl, the method he called after phenomenological.
Naturally, this will be the sine qua non of Husserl's thought. Husserl admits no existential stance of any kind, neither affirmative nor negative, doubtful or not. Is therefore simply refraining from taking any position and then I can not go wrong, because neither affirm nor deny, or doubt. It is therefore a method purely descriptive and that is what will characterize the phenomenology as a method.
course, Husserl does not stop at this. Husserl will make not only a descriptive phenomenological method, it will make a phenomenological philosophy. That is ultimately going to take an idealistic position, which disregards the stance, but that really makes a phenomenological description that retains the quality of the act and object.
When I execute an act of abstention, an act of elimination of all theses, all positions, the subject of the act, the act's contents and subject all of them succumb to epokhé disappears any argument, any position, in short. And this is going to be just what he called the phenomenological method and then the notes will join together by foundation-the word used by Husserl's foundation-and thus to find some, I find the others. Indeed Ortega
a term used more English, more clear, spoke of complication and involvement. If you take, for example, a color, the color is attached to the extension, color is always an extension. But obviously they are not united by implication but complication: the color can not exist only in extent, but the extent may not be colored. There is thus a unilateral relationship between size and color and this is what he calls complications. The word foundation is a little less clear for the English and Ortega speaks of involvement and complexity. The extension involves color, complicated color extension.
Therefore, the phenomenological method is a descriptive approach, but what? Not realities, but the experiences of pure consciousness. Consciousness is precisely what is left when I do a phenomenological reduction. And then there will be another reduction, which he called eidetic, ie the content is passed directly to the contents of consciousness eidetic, ie the essence, the essence of pure consciousness.
As you see, is a highly robust method is a method that guarantees the evidence, that represents the security of what is described, avoiding "one must be careful in this because if not confused all-all stance existential.
You might say this is a bit difficult, because the disappearance of all, the disappearance of the subject, the act-the quality of the act, and object, disappears all reality. And everything is reduced to the world of ideal objects. This is characteristic and this is the foundation of the universal validity of phenomenology. You think that the great disciples of Husserl, Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, the authors of the theory of values, Heidegger, capital figure them all, ultimately, practice, practice epokhé . Theoretically they provide, we would say, a kind of assent to the idea of \u200b\u200b epokhé , but do not actually practice it. And it's funny how ultimately vested in the position to eliminate the epokhé . This reacts with great hostility Husserl, it seems that this is unacceptable and says "Tua res agitur", this is your thing, ie not in any way accept relapse in position, we say, naive, accepting the existence or denied or questioned.
This has a consequence, however, very serious and interesting as Ortega, who hosted the very early phenomenology-Ortega writes about phenomenology since the publication of Ideas, in 1913 - and yet he tells it in that famous Preface for Germans, who wrote in 1934, which almost immediately rejected the phenomenology after adopting it, having discovered it as a great method of philosophy. There is a text, a foreword he wrote-and this is curious Ortega: He used to say things are not in technical journals, but a prologue to a poet, a book by an Andalusian poet, José Moreno Villa, and in that prologue makes the criticism of phenomenology without even naming it. He demonstrates, in this important prologue to the phenomenological reduction is impossible, ie, rejects from the year following the theory has been formulated in 1913, and this type Ortega 1914.
For one thing, if a board would have here a very clear [JM is a description that corresponds to the diagram below):
(I _________> the act and its intentional object _______> quality)
item is being brackets by the phenomenological reduction. Now, how do you put the parentheses of the epokhé ? The parenthesis is put out, so encompassing the subject, the act with its quality and the intentional object. It gets out and is therefore eliminated any position of reality. Yes, but this break has been from outside, not from within, and can naturally return to take another parenthesis: I can now put in brackets and reduced the previous act, the act reduced phenomenally, but I can do it only from outside brackets that putting another parenthesis that encompasses it. Therefore, the act of putting aside, the act of abstention is done from outside the parentheses.
That is, I can not jump over the shadow ... In other words, it is not possible the fundamental act that underpins everything. What is interesting now is that if you read recent writings of phenomenology in particular, the French have cultivated a phenomenological school are constantly using Husserl's capital as a concept, which called Lebenswelt die, the life-world. However, the concept of Husserl's life world is not, is the opposite of Husserl, is precisely what has never accepted in his life until very recent years. And it's interesting because it is a trivial concept: Do not forget that Ortega, since 1914, from the time you accepted and did not stay in phenomenology say: "I am myself and my circumstances and if not save it unless I myself. " And that is just beginning the core of the thought of Ortega is currently expressed, currently, not before as Lebenswelt. Husserl's just the world has never been a vital world, was an ideal world, it was deduced phenomenologically without any argument, without representation or denial or doubt. That is, after his conversations with Husserl Ortega 1934, when Ortega carefully explained his point of view, the fundamental philosophical position. And this is now circulating in the world, in phenomenological ways, as Husserl - it seems to me perfect, because obviously if Husserl arrived at that point of view of the vital world of Lebenswel t, if he a further step in thinking, eliminating the impossible epokhé perfect. But, of course, the only thing is that it clearly represents the three or four years of Husserl and not all of his work, he did deny his great disciples, because he said he did phenomenology, psychology or anthropology but .. .
And then there's another step: the eidetic reduction, which not only reduces precisely to the experience, but the essence of the experiences of pure consciousness. When Ortega takes a position on this important point in the phenomenology of Husserl, he adds something very interesting is that for Husserl, as he makes his phenomenological philosophy, he says reality-the translation is very curious, "on nothing", which is a curious way of saying "absolute" - that is the elimination of all empirical experience and thus of pure consciousness. For Husserl, the reality "on nothing" is consciousness.
But Ortega arrives in his criticism of the extreme: it will say that there is consciousness, because consciousness is not a reality. Because the distinction that "I have consciousness" is not accurate, when I say that "I have consciousness of" I have is "things and me." And therefore, interpolation, we would say, this concept of consciousness, pure consciousness, is not faithful to reality, the reality is "the thing-I"; things and me. As you can see, this is exactly the formula Ortega "I am myself and my circumstance" and he added "if you save it, not me but me." As you can see, therefore, accept the method as a reliable method, rigorous, descriptive, that is faithful to reality, does not accept are the fundamental theoretical concepts: epokhé , phenomenological reduction and the concept of conscience that is not the reality, the reality is consciousness, the reality is me with things, I with the circumstances.
As you can see, the phenomenological method is absolutely extraordinary, completely renewed philosophy from the beginning century, has led to use a method of extreme fidelity to reality, of scrupulous fidelity to which is attached by implication or complication. There is also the fact that ideal objects are discovered, there is a huge proliferation of ideal objects, the intention was positivism was a certain poverty-with great rigor, which is extremely valuable. And finally
philosophy primarily a descriptive method that is going to be just as fruitful, but what Husserl introduces this phenomenological philosophy, precisely because a remnant of positivism, not to be completely free of prejudice against positivist that can not make any take a position and that we must reduce the content of phenomenological experiences as a first step to eliminate any question of existence, in a second step to rise to the essence of pure consciousness, and this was definitely not justified.
Whereupon, Ortega is making the release of certain prejudices of phenomenology, holding it that is fruitful, which is the method as such, descriptive method, fidelity precisely the distinction of the real with all their wealth, with all its contents, avoiding "Of course, the existential question, but retaining all content.
from Husserl's philosophy has been the most valuable. Do not forget that Husserl published Yearbook phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, which published the most interesting works of later philosophers, such as a logical and Pfänder, Scheler and Edith Stein, who is now very famous, too, even religiously and this has been the most valuable of the twentieth century thought. I have a bibliographical curiosity: I have not only the first edition of Sein und Zeit , Heidegger's great book, published in 1927, but the zero edition, which was first published in the Yearbook , with two other books, and only then as independent book.
And interestingly, as in the writings of Husserl, he ultimately eliminates the phenomenological value of these books, precisely because they reject its theoretical underpinnings. And after that reconciliation is posthumously, through the concept of Lebenswelt, vital world, that is produced, in short, the renunciation of epokhé and what was most acute in the discrepancy between Husserl and his great disciples.
How can we see us now, in 2000, the thought of Husserl? We see it differently: we retain what is discovery, acquisition opportunities for exploration of reality, while giving the phenomenological reduction and its consequences. Today we are much closer Husserl and his disciples that what appeared in Husserl's life.
