by Maurizio Ferraris
Translation of Luis de Santiago, in Vattimo, G., Rovatti, PA (eds.) Weak thought, Cátedra, Madrid, 2000, pp. 169-191.
has been Paul Ricoeur, in his essay on Freud, de l'interprétation [i], who enforced the common name of "school of suspicion" to the triad Nietzsche-Freud-Marx. At this point, Ricoeur summarizes a fairly widespread position in contemporary culture, stating that the nexus that unites thinkers to initially less distant as far as concerns method and intent, as Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, would be a shared activity, "exposure" in a program and radical attempt to expose these deceptions in the history of philosophy . For the "school of suspicion", think equivalent to interpret. But the interpretation follows a "dizzying": not only traditions, received ideas, ideology, are misleading and mystifying, but the very notion of "truth" is the effect of stratification (and mystifying) historical, whose origins are rhetorical, emotional, concerned. The meaning "own" the true meaning of appearances and the secondary formations are the metaphor, is itself derived from something dark, something which, in turn, should also be subject to interpretation.
As Nietzsche writes in a page from the Book of the philosopher, "truths are illusions that have forgotten their true nature, metaphors that have lost significantly; currencies in which the coin has disappeared and that, consequently, are no longer considered as currency, but as metal "[ii].
Partly due to the influence of external circumstances pertaining to the history of culture in the broadest sense "school of suspicion" has been found, especially in the last twenty years, a very favorable reception; just think, for example, phenomena such as Nietzsche-Renaissance in France and in Italy, the widespread distribution of psychoanalysis.
But secondly, and probably not only by the disappearance of the circumstances "cultural" that led to its success, the "school of suspicion" pretty obvious signs manifested today expiration. Much more apparent as aging, however, Hermeneutics "in general"-and, particularly, the thought of Gadamer, today tends to impose itself as the horizon of philosophy itself "traditional" no methodical reflection about the philosophical and linguistic tradition.
Initially, one might even venture the hypothesis that hermeneutics has won its unifying role, its role as linguistic and theoretical koinè precisely bracketing more clearly exposes the intentions of the "school of suspicion" and appearing, not as a break and overcome the philosophical tradition, but as his memory and storage.
No doubt the reasons are obvious "cultural history" that have ruled the aging of the "school of suspicion" and the assertion of the hermeneutics of Gadamer court, but the fact remains that, within theoretical propiamene, left standing, at least three questions, which in part will try to answer in the pages that follow: a) what are the intrinsic limits of the hermeneutics of suspicion?, b) what is your relationship to Gadamer's hermeneutics?; c), to what extent some contamination of hermeneutics and the "school of suspicion" as the Grammatology by Jacques Derrida, retain some philosophic actuality in the panorama of contemporary theoretical reflection?
1. Unmasking LIMITS Two
analysis, Foucault and Derrida, can help to define more precisely some of the internal borders of the hermeneutics of suspicion.
First, Foucault, writing in 1964, recognizes two
risks to the mode of action of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx: nihilism and dogmatism. First, the nihilism [iii]. Foucault writes that the intensification of interpretation "unmasking" is constant over a mask to another, as they hide behind a mask other, and the metaphors continue to infinity without ever reaching a terminus ad quem, and wondered, about why that intensification can lead to the conclusion that, in reality, there is nothing to be fully understood and that the hermeneutic process runs itself.
Indeed, this result not only characterizes nihilistic hermeneutics of suspicion, but hermeneutics in general, think, say, in certain traits typically nihilistic reflection Gadamer, for whom the notion of "strong" really diluted in a dialogue diffuse in a collective exchange of meanings that are not supported by any stable referent, and not lead to the attainment of ultimate truths. However, if the hermeneutics of suspicion is, according to Foucault, different because, in her nihilistic resolution concerning the interpretation possesses shades typically aporetic until
provide a point of pathological character-a hermeneutics that contrary to what happens, for example, Gadamer, is overall "giddy." It ends this way, Foucault writes, in "a hermeneutics back on itself, which enters the territory of the languages \u200b\u200bthat autoimplican constantly, in the mythical region of pure madness and language" [iv].
Meanwhile, dogmatism is the reverse of nihilistic self-implication interpretations, in a sense, is merely the result of a reaction, which remains within the same field from what he faces. On the Genealogy of Morals, describing the genesis of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche writes: "Better is a sense either that the absence of any meaning." Tired of so many masks, the player can stop at any of them or rely on a preconceived hermeneutical key, under which each signifier corresponds a stable meaning. Thus establishing a code, and hermeneutics becomes a semiotic.
Foucault also wrote: "A hermeneutic, in fact, become semiotic believe in the absolute existence of signs: abandons violence, unfinished, the infinity of interpretations, and makes the sign reign terror and beware of language that "[v].
Once again we face the ambiguity inscribed in all
hermeneutics of suspicion, always in danger of an excess or defect of interpretation; duplication that accompanies all unmasking appeal to rationality, and can also result in terms of a dialectic of Enlightenment, like the one drawn Adorno and Horkheimer: "Nietzsche understood, as very few after Hegel, the dialectic of Enlightenment, and has articulated the contradictory relationship that joins the domain. It should "spread the Enlightenment among the people, so that the priests acquire, all of them, bad conscience, and the same should be done in relation to the state. The role of the Enlightenment is to transform the whole behavior of the princes and rulers in a deliberate lie. " On the other hand, the Enlightenment has always been a tool of the "great artists in the work of government" [vi].
nihilism and dogmatism are mutually reinforcing, the exposure tends or turning in on oneself, or to lay the foundations of a new dogmatic myth eventually characterized by a "mythical horror to the myth" [vii].
Foucault analyzes try, therefore, indicate the present limits on the results, inevitable or not a hermeneutics of suspicion. Derrida, for his part, especially in consideration of the 'white mythology', which form the core of "Western metaphysics" - he says insistently dysfunction constitutes a contradiction originates, which characterize the project unmasked as such.
Nietzsche's passage reproduced in the preceding paragraph, and Derrida says in his essay on "Mythologie blanche" [viii] - appears at first glance as an attempt to "overcome metaphysics." Through a particular hermeneutic extreme, Nietzsche seems to reveal the hidden clauses in the metaphysical concept of "truth", which then manifests itself as a simple metaphor.
But Derrida contends, are we sure that this will entail exposure is not so intimate and constitutive, with the history of metaphysics? Apparently, Nietzsche reveals, according to the Enlightenment, a typical "white mythology," the belief in a stable foundation of truth, in order to be true, beyond the pollutions of the doxa and interest . In fact, however, this exposure is shown closely related with the very thing you want to correct, that is, is presented as "typically" metaphysical.
Indeed, Derrida continues, what is the Sino-metaphysical ambition to uncover the metaphors, to overcome the veil of appearance? Rather than the metaphor of the coin, brought it up by Nietzsche, should consider the comparison of light-conceived and comprehensive picture of all hermeneutics of suspicion and all metaphysics, which perfectly illustrates how the desire to expose more than shelter contamination of metaphysics, is in fact the very essence of what, in the tradition of Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is understood with this name.
"foundational metaphor," writes Derrida, "not only as metaphor photoblog-and in this regard, the history of our philosophy is a Fotología, understood as the history or light-treated, but already As metaphor, the metaphor in general, passage of an entity to another, or meaning to another, authorized by the initial submission and a shift from analog to be under the body, is the initial gravitational traps and suppresses the flow inevitably metaphysics. Destination that only a certain naivete can be considered as reprehensible, but provisional, crash of a "history" as a slip, a mistake of thinking in history (in history). It is, in Historiam,
drop in the philosophy of thought, by which history has begun its course [ix].
The desire to unmask, to project a light bulb beyond the veil of appearances
, to achieve the proper sense hidden behind the metaphor is not the final act of metaphysics, the "noon of the free spirit 'of Nietzsche spoken on the contrary, is just the initial act of all metaphysics. On the other hand, metaphysics is not just for ignoring the "truth" itself is just an old metaphor, it is, rather, because, conscious metaphorical character of its own statements, has attempted throughout its history to reduce the metaphorical meaning of its own, appropriate, conceptually unambiguous.
If considered from this perspective, it is no longer tied to a dialectic of Enlightenment
but rather the interpretation of Heidegger's "history of metaphysics as the history of forgetfulness of being-the hermeneutics of suspicion is presented as the culmination of this adventure. The subject that "reveals" that recognizes a more or less nihilistic multiple funds hidden behind the metaphor, or after the Freudian consciousness or false consciousness which is the subject of criticism of ideologies is precisely the metaphysical subject par excellence, which embodies the will to power itself in the "will to interpret."
2. TABLE OF Hermeneutics. RECONSTRUCTION AND INTEGRATION
Thus the conclusion, not too paradoxical, considering the hermeneutics of suspicion as a typical example of thinking 'strong', assertive, metaphysical ... to a degree comparable to the naive belief, positive or ideological aims unmask. And that, not only because of the possible consequences that might lead "the nihilism of the interpretation or dogmatism, crystallization in a semiotics or a structure, "but mainly because the task that the unmasking strongly encouraged.
These considerations are clarified to try to classify this type of
hermencútica infield typology proposed by Gadamer in Truth and Method [x].
Referring specifically to the aesthetics and interpretation of works of art inherited from tradition, Gadamer discussed, before presenting his own model
interpretive hermeneutical two modes considered insufficient: the reconstruction, which defends Schleiermacher, and integration, given by the Hegelian philosophy of history [xi]. Relate hermeneutics with the works of the past, writes Gadamer, does not mean or reconstruct the original historical world in which they saw the light, according to Schleiermacher claims, or simply according to the Hegelian model, inscribe these works in the movement of a historical teleology, which would link, through mediation by the thought, with the present moment.
In Gadamer's perspective, integration, as hermeneutic practice, requires a different mediation, no mediation by the absolute spirit, but that language essentially a tradition carried out with the work that this tradition bequeathed us.
hermeneutics relationship consists, therefore, a tradition, transmission and translation that integrates the work inevitably lost over time and what it earns, ie the historical and spiritual world in which born, hopelessly lost, and history-largely accidental, that is, without guidance, no urgent non-teleological and their performances, their "fortune"; history, therefore, becomes part of the same work the object to be interpreted as such.
Wirkungsgeschichte concept [xii], to "history of effects", assumes that the work is constitutively spurious, inauthentic, or, which is, that the interpretation is always carried out in an area already committed, and that, therefore, strictly speaking, the "unmasking" is not possible. If, from this perspective, consider again the example of Nietzsche, that of truth as an old metaphor, we find that the sense-the reduction of metaphor, the unveiling of the "proper", allegedly hidden by the metaphorical trope constitutively is unattainable, and that the interpretation
would rather establish a connection, more diffuse and less exposed peremptorily, with the historical succession of interpretations, of metaphors, of translations of meaning.
More specifically, we try to frame the hermeneutics of suspicion within the typology
Gadamer, we notice that the will to overcome the veil (historical, ideological, positive) appearance, or the attempt to transcend metaphysics tout court is revealed visibly akin to Schleiermacher reconstructive project, namely, the outline of a hermeneutics that covers internal and external joints of the work to restore, along with its structure, also the historical world in which he saw the light, the origin.
Indeed, in the school of suspicion, especially as regards
Freud and Nietzsche, there are plenty of safeguards "anti-metaphysical", among which should be listed a greater interest in the effects, given the circumstances that have given rise to some theoretical or moral concept, but this does not negate the fact that the fundamental hermeneutical intention is that of putting into practice a reconstructive analysis.
As shown exemplarily the historical vicissitudes of Freudian metapsychology and the same
Freudian hermeneutics of suspicion
actually tends to establish a direct and proper 'metaphysics' with nature, with the immediate, drives border with origins etahistóricos biological behaviors.
can therefore be applied to the "school of suspicion" as Gadamer writes about hermeneutics "reconstructive" of Schleiermacher: "In short, such a definition of hermeneutics is no less contradictory than any restitution or restoration of a past life. If we look at the historical nature of our being, the reconstruction of the original conditions as any other type of restoration, appears as a doomed enterprise. Life repaired, recovered from their state of alienation, and life is not original, it simply becomes, retaining its status alienated, a second life in the field of culture [...]. Thus, an operation to conceive
hermeneutics to understand how the restoration of origin would, just, pure communication of an obsolete meaning "[xiii].
reconstructive attempts to encourage the hermeneutics of suspicion are not less than inspired, though for different purposes, the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher.
towards them, of course, the project of integration by
Gadamer shows, more clearly, such a procedure "weak", certainly less assertive and metaphysical. As
integration advocated by Hegel, Gadamer's hermeneutics is based on the awareness of the impossibility of any restoration of any definitive interpretation or total transparency. But by replacing the Hegelian philosophy of history (teleological fundamental reasons) by the concept of Wirkungsgeschichte, Gadamer further weakens the will "unmask" deposited in the hermeneutic act. The interpretation does not fall and in the context of an attempt to return, complete restoration of origin even more, or even better, to motivate the succession of interpretations and transformations, the "downbeat" of history, but that considering the inheritance-ultimately accidental - a series of different interpretations, which change while the object of our awareness of interpretation and interpreters (as well as our way of "closer" to the object).
Rather than being presented as the achievement of a final transparency of evidence that does not support views, hermeneutics shows now submerged in a constitutive opacity. First of all, writes Gadamer, the Wirkungsgeschichte "early to pronounce on what is presented to us as problematic as the search object, and we forget half of what it is, indeed, forget the whole truth historical phenomenon, if we take that phenomenon, in its immediacy, as the truth "[xiv]. In short, the hermeneutics of suspicion is affected, as reconstructive hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, the historicist illusion which is not brought into question the historical picture that determines the subject of interpretation, on the contrary, hermeneutics Gadamer arises precisely from the consciousness of the historical factors that define us as interpreters. 'Integration' hermeneutics is thus, above all, a temporary procedure, changeable, unstable "historical meaning can not be ever fully become autotransparente "[xv].
At this point one might wonder if all the requirements "debilitating" in relation to the peremptory nature of hermeneutics of suspicion are met by the draft Gadamer.
3. INTEGRATION OF THE DE-CONSTRUCTION
As much as does face an opacity that eliminates most urgent intentions of the hermeneutics of suspicion, Gadamer's interpretative model with at least one trait that sets out immediately to criticism. This is the clear predominance of continuity - between present and past, in particular, but also between moments of a tradition- that characterizes it. A continuing trend toward acting in two directions: first, the unproblematic nature of the interpreter access to the legacy of a tradition (texts, documents, monuments), the second, the excessive ease with which Gadamer seeks to establish a productive dialogue between the texts of that tradition and the current conditions of social dialogue.
The two trends are obviously related. Using terminology
Heidegger, Gadamer arguably "makes present"
too clearly the tradition that avoids, in a way too fast, the caesuras and the differences observed in it [xvi]. The observations in Truth and Method on the interpretation of written texts are, in this respect, quite significant. Indeed, Gadamer writes: "In the form of writing, everything that is transmitted any time becomes contemporary present. It gives a peculiar coexistence depaso and present, as this awareness is the possibility of free access to any written tradition, without resorting to oral transmission, it mixes news past and present, on the contrary, addressing directly to the literary tradition, which includes awareness takes a genuine possibility of widening one's horizons, enriching thus the world itself with a new dimension "[xvii].
The past, as it passed us by writing-that is, as pure idealism, without contamination and spurious mediations with this, which are always given on the talk-the paradoxical simultaneity conquest to the present. A contemporary who contradistingue also by strong transparency, an "evidence" of writing itself peculiar in short, by a desire to communicate, which Gadamer accepts as if not closed virtually no problems: "In all that we have come in the form of writing lies a will of persistence, forged by the peculiar form of permanence that we call literature. It not only gives us a set of monuments and signs. On the contrary, all belonging to the literature has a specific contemporary with any present. Understanding does not mean literature primarily traced back to a past existence, but to participate in this, a content of the above "[xviii].
reconstructive Will the interpretation would restore the past as past, the origin in its entirety, the objective truth of the intentions of the author of a text. For his part, Gadamer considerations, although directed against this attempt, they tend to define writing as a vehicle of tradition, in terms of a abstract ideality of language. In this regard, Gadamer writes: "As written, the language reaches its true spirituality, and that, in the written tradition includes the awareness that rises to a position of full sovereignty. No longer depend on anything strange. Thus, the awareness that reads
is potentially in possession of history "[xix].
No longer repetition of the past, understanding becomes participation in this sense. Guaranteed by the spirituality of writing, a fundamental continuity-league moments scattered and remote, and after, perhaps not fully understood, making them present in the interpretation. The Gadamer integration raises the question whether the first task of hermeneutics would not so much in building a bridge between us as performers and tradition that allegedly belong, but rather to ask whether this assumption is legitimate, and, therefore, if our belonging to the tradition is so linear that enables access "simultaneous" to the texts, as advocated by Gadamer.
In short, it appears that while the hermeneutics of suspicion tends to put emphasis on the aspects "dizzying" and aporetic of interpretation, Gadamer integration is presented as a position too peaceful as a very little problem with the legacies of tradition, understood as hermeneutical objects. (On the other hand, this impression is confirmed by examining the problem of integration in the opposite direction, ie, considering the way Gadamer, for example, in the controversy with Habermas [xx] - seeks to isolate two types of heterogeneous dialogue: the interpreter with the tradition, which takes place between members of society. Again, the tradition is reduced to the presence at this dialog, or, conversely, the latter is entered without difficulty into the groove tradition.)
Given this done this, you can better understand why Derrida has decided to launch the hypothesis of a Grammatology: the hermeneutics of tradition is no longer considered as a coherent set of texts we virtually simultaneous and transparent to the reading, but as caesuras analysis of the discontinuities, lack of essential transparency of a traditio which has ceased to belong or who has never been ours.
From this perspective, the objects of interpretation, above all, the texts, not offered at their "true spirituality", but rather in a state of opaque material, such as 'monuments' or 'signs', or as fingerprints that can never be present, if we adopt the terminology of Derrida. And the task of interpretation does not intend to reconstruct the past, as in the school of suspicion, or integrate it into the present, along the lines of Gadamer, but on the contrary, attempts to deconstruct a tradition made up of prints and texts never be fully intelligible.
In fact, the fundamental goal of deconstruction is, itself, to think the difference, the gap between our understanding of the objects to which it applies. Hermeneutics activity becomes, at this point, in an unanswered question, is valuable primarily as an ontological exercise, as inconmensurablidad indication of understanding the subject matter of understanding. "The question Derrida writes in an essay on Levinas, must be preserved. But as polling. Freedom of the question (double genitive) must be affirmed and defended. Stay grounded, tradition for the question that continues to be questioning "[xxi].
Here, the tradition continues only as hermeneutic object, such as thematic unity of interpretation, but does not offer, as in Gadamer, a positive approach
understanding, legitimacy "historical" (all weak and not transparent take your pick) of the act of interpretation. In relation to the hermeneutic re-constructive or integrative, the deconstruction advocated by Derrida is presented as the extreme dilution of the purpose of truly understanding, to penetrate to the core, if not of things, at least of language and tradition, deposit repertoire of philosophical keywords.
Grammatology The objective is not to indicate the sense of tradition or the legitimacy of an interpretation, but untie, dissolve or transform into discontinuous, with the introduction of corners or margins of play instituted models (and positively exercised) of interpretation. This function critique of the deconstruction is clearly seen, in a different field, that of the controversy with analytic philosophy in Derrida's reply to John Searle, who accused him of having misunderstood the theory of speech acts: "A theoretical the linguistic act, "writes Derrida, claiming the legitimacy of the build-own-provided with a minimum dose of consistency with his own theory, there should be some time enpleado discuss problems like the following: the fundamental purpose," is to be true? In real appear? In affirming the truth? "[xxii].
But at this point is Derrida clearly has changed his perspective, not only regarding the concept
widespread philosophy in the tradition of linguistic analysis, but also in comparison with the purposes and modes of practice the interpretation of both the 'school of suspicion "as hermeneutics of Gadamer.
4. Philosophy as a kind of writing
What is this change of perspective? First of all, regarding the internal affairs of Grammatology, this mutation involves a new way to interact with written texts and the problem of writing in general. In the debate with Searle reads something explicitly, implicitly, can be detected in all the work of Derrida: Of Grammatology radically put in brackets the problem of "reference" to the reality and the ability to replace, with a ceremony indicative function "foundations" of writing and interpreting texts. Grammatology is a type of writing, and not simply
stylistic skills it takes, but, above all, because the "reference" is only the written tradition (philosophical, metaphysical), which constitutes us as interpreters. The Derrida is, therefore, use an emphatic and somewhat transformed the classic hermeneutical principle of sola scriptura, but precisely as it is a matter of emphasis, in fact highlights a trend already implicitly contained in hermeneutics as such.
Grammatology's thesis as "kind of writing 'occupies a central place in an essay by Richard Rorty, recently included in a larger writing [xxiii]. In the words of Rorty, when taken as a reference only the corpus of the philosophical tradition, Derrida would become the last follower of a "line" of modern thought that has its origins in Hegel, and is opposed to a Lignea parallel, Kantian origin, the latter argues that thinking is contrary to the assertions of Derrida, relating, the best way possible, with objects and real world structures and natural. This second tradition also holds that writing is merely a "supplement" (adopting terminology that Derrida
making Rousseau), and that language itself tends, asymptotically, the very self-suppression, for the pure display or ostentation, maximum understood as correspondence between mind and nature. And, as Derrida would Lignea follower of Hegel, the exponents of the "line" Kant are represented in the words of Rorty, by the Anglo-Saxon language analysts [xxiv].
however, continues Rorty, relationship between 'Hegelian' and 'Kantian' exclusion is not simple or mutual misunderstanding, and indeed, it might seem, but rather may be equivalent to the distinction that the epistemological debate between the "critical science" and the normal science or the difference between 'abuse' and normality tout court. Thus, parasitism Grammatology-which Rorty makes in relation to linguistic analysis but the conclusions of the preceding paragraph can also be applied to Gadamer's hermeneutics, not shown as a simple "transfer" as a path interrupted, but as a kind of land experimental, along
critical and inventive. Rorty writes: "The dispute between Kantians and non-Kantian [...] presents a contrast between those who want to accept (and see) things as they are, [...] and who, by contrast, wanted to transform the current vocabulary "[xxv].
In light of these considerations, we revisit the problem of relations between the Grammatology, on the one hand, Gadamer's hermeneutics and the "school of suspicion" on the other. In short, the peculiarities of Derrida's work can be summarized in three points: 1) The most immediate effect of Grammatology, as we have seen, critical of the "continuous" Gadamer. In a sense, Derrida wields against the hermeneutics of 'integration' weapons that resemble the requirements "debunkers" of the school of suspicion. And indeed, a critical dimension can only give meaning to a set of analysis, such as the Grammatology, which, by virtue of its structure "arquitéctonica" and under "system" organization theory that seems to be no must have had significance. In itself, talking about science Grammatology as written traces of meaningless signifiers and the like, or outline a theory of différence, ie waste or waste and non-explicit aspects of a tradition, it makes little sense, Derrida himself is, moreover, conscious, as evidenced by their insistence on the ineffability of la difference. Much more sensible,
regarding the "continuity" of Gadamer's hermeneutics, is, however, the effect of "constructive, critical, Grammatology, applied to a tradition that we are inclined to" read "as homogeneous and translatable.
2) However, to highlight this critical issue is not equivalent to the simple recovery of debunkers intentions school of suspicion. The unmasking has been rather replaced by the invention of terminology, that is, first, by a work on the signifier and signified not. It therefore excluded the possibility of achieving, through the deconstruction of a tradition or of certain concepts pertaining to it, a real and fundamental sense, meaning "own" basic. Transform philosophy into a kind of writing means essentially, through stylistic procedures, terminology, or by a distortion or an abuse of certain semantic fields, "making possible" the philosophical tradition, opening the way for new possibilities hermeneutics. The problem of school suspicion is translated by Derrida in terms of a debate between "science criticism" and "normal science." For example, in one of the writings included in L'écriture et la différence, reads: "Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger [...] have acted within concepts inherited from metaphysics. However, since these concepts are not actually pure elements or atoms, but are made in a syntax and a system, the acceptance of any of them fully reintroduce metaphysics. This is what allows these destroyers to destroy each other, for example, makes it possible to consider Heidegger Nietzsche-with a lucidity and rigor comparable to bad faith and misunderstanding, as the last metaphysician, as the last "platonic." The operation could be repeated with regard to Heidegger's own, Freud or anyone else. There is most common operation nowadays it "[xxvi].
The simple succession of unmasking is derived from the naive adoption of the language received. By contrast, the "philosophy conceived as a kind of writing" and, therefore, an invention, means in the context of Derrida's introduction of a double bind relationship with the philosophical tradition on the one hand, you give up hope overcome, a radical unmasking the 'metaphysics', and secondly, the game and terminological changes introduced in that same tradition can eliminate the peremptory nature of the metaphysical (character, by contrast, tends to play by the estate of the unmasking).
3) A third consequence of the "parasite" of Grammatology. The double bind relationship established between Derrida and deconstruction of tradition is, in short, the anthropologist's own [xxvii]. That is, the link comes from a double consciousness: first, that of radical discontinuity that separates us from a tradition we do not necessarily belong, and second, the conviction that it is inevitable that we use a language and that this condition us (as it is unavoidable the "ethnocentrism"). Considered from the point of view "ethnological" the problem of interpretation would, in this case, to give a positive status and recognizable to the problem of discontinuity in relation to our philosophical tradition, and this, without giving emphasis intermission that truly " metaphysical "proper" school of suspicion, and, moreover, not take for granted a basic consistency between our present and past of philosophy, as Gadamer succeeds.
[i] Cf De l'interpretation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, trad. E. Italy Renzi: Della interpretazione. Saggio its Freud, Milan, 11 Saggiatore, 1966; see
particularly, pp. 46 et seq. of trad. Italian (L'interpretazione come Esercizio of sospetto).
[ii] Not yet available in the Opere edited by Colli and Montanari, Il philosopher book is translated in a separate volume: Rome, Savelli, 1978. The event included here, slightly modified by us can be found on pg. 76.
[iii] "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx ', in Cahiers de Royaumont, 6, Paris, Minuit, 1967 (Proceedings of Royaumont international conference on Nietzsche), pages 182-192.
[iv] Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, cit., P.. 192.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, Dialektik des Aufklärung, Amsterdam, Querido
Verlag, 1947, trans. Italian L. Vinci: Diarletica dell'illuminismo, Turin, Einaudi, 1974, pg. 53; the Stressing is ours.
[vii] Op cit., P.. 37.
[viii] "La Mythologie blanche," in Poétique, 5 (1971), now J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Madrid, Cátedra, 1988. See, especially, the last section of the essay, The métaphysique Relief métaphore, pp. 308 ff.
[ix] "Force et signification", in Critique, 193-194 (Junio-Julio 1963), L'écriture Ahora in
et la difference, Paris, Seuil, 1967, trad. Italian G. Pozzi: The scrittura e la differenza, Einaudi, Torino, 1971, pg. 34.
[x] HG Gadamer, Wahrheit und Method, Tubingen, Mohr, 19723, trans. Italian G. V
attimo: Veritas and method, Milan, Bompiani, 19833.
[xi] Cf., In particular pp. 202-207 Ricostruzione-competes and eats integrazione
ermeneutici-of trad. Italian and true method.
[xii] Cf., Especially "II della principle" Wirkungsgeschichte "" in Truth and Method, trans. Italian cit., pp. 350-363.
[xiii] Op cit., P.. 205.
[xiv] Op cit., P.. 351.
[xv] Op cit., P.. 352.
[xvi] On the predominance of continuity in Gadamer's interpretation of the artwork as well as in Gadamer's hermeneutics in general, see G. Vattimo, "Estetica ed hermeneutics", in Rivista di Estetica, ns, 1 (1979), pp. 3-15.
[xvii] Truth and Method, trans. Italian cit., p.. 448.
[xviii] Op cit., P.. 450, emphasis added.
[xix] Op cit., P.. 449.
[xx] See, for example, replicas of Gadamer to Habermas' Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik "in Kleine Schrifien, vol. l, Tübingen, Mohr, trad. Various Authors Part Italian, Turin, 1973, pp. 55 et seq.
[xxi] J. Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique. Essai sur la pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas ", in Revue de métaphysique et de Morale, 3 and 4 (1964) L'écriture now et la différence, trans. Italian cit., p.. 100.
[xxii] "Limited Inc. abc," in Glyph, 2 (1977), pp. 162-254, 178.
[xxiii] R. Rorty, Philosophy as a Kind of Writing. An Estay on Derrida, in ID, Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972 - 1980), Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982.
[xxiv] For example, Searle mean that the debate between Derrida and Austin can
regarded as a confrontation between two traditions, and argues that it is a simple misunderstanding of the theory of speech acts by Derrida (see J. Searle, "Reiterating the Differences (reply to Derrida)," in Glyph, 1, 1977, pp. 198-208).
[xxv] Consequences of Pragmatism, cit., P.. 107.
[xxvi] The structure, he signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines (1966), L'écriture now et la différence, trans. Italian cit., p.. 363.
[xxvii] The same draft Grammatology emerges from the discussion of "ethnocentrism" of Levi-Strauss in reference to the problem of literate societies. See J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, Paris, Minuit, 1967, pp. 149 ff.
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